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Abstract 
Loss leader strategy refers to a pricing strategy in which sellers set much lower prices 
than the original ones for specific products to attract user attention. Similar to brick-and-
mortar stores, online marketplaces often try to expose their platforms more visibly to 
potential buyers by offering a particular product at a lower price. Yet, the effects of the 
loss leader strategy on the online marketplaces is indeterminate and largely remains an 
empirical question due to distinguished characteristics of online marketplaces from the 
traditional retail setting. This study examines the effects of the loss leader strategy in the 
context of the two-sided online platform, focusing on the changes of both buying and 
selling sides after the introduction of loss leader. We collaborate with an online travel 
marketplace that introduced loss leaders (ticket products with lower price) to parts of 
sub-markets, providing a natural experimental setting for examining the effect of the loss 
leaders.  
Keywords:  Loss leader strategy; two-sided online platform; online marketplace; platform 
 
Introduction 
In a traditional retail setting, a “loss leader” refers to a pricing strategy in which sellers set much lower 
prices than the original ones for specific products to attract user attention (Hess and Gerstner 1987). Sellers 
expect that buyers will purchase other products while buying (or not buying) the loss leading products. 
While the effect of loss leading strategy on a store’s profits is disputable, it has been widely agreed that the 
loss leader has a positive impact in terms of increased store traffic (Walters and MacKenzie 1988).  
It is worth emphasizing that a considerable amount of economic activity has moved online in recent 
decades, and this transition seems to be more pronounced as a result of smartphones and mobile 
applications. Similar to brick-and-mortar stores (see Lewis (2006)), online marketplaces often try to expose 
their platforms more visibly to potential buyers by offering a particular product at a lower price. It is not 
special to see many online marketplaces adopt the loss leader strategy in various forms as the advent of 
online marketplaces has become prevalent in recent decades. As online marketplaces came to play an 
important role in facilitating transactions in many fields, it is necessary to understand the underlying 
mechanisms of economic behaviors, which may differ from those in a traditional setting. A strand of 
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information systems (IS) literature has focused on different dynamics of those online marketplaces, such 
as network externalities (Anderson Jr et al. 2013; Asvanund et al. 2004; Song et al. 2018), and competition 
(Bakos and Katsamakas 2008; Mantena and Saha 2012; Tiwana 2015).  Surprisingly, however, it is not well 
known whether the loss leader strategy can bring real benefits to the online marketplaces. For example, a 
notable difference is that digital platforms can reduce the search and transaction costs of buyers; thus, they 
can switch to other products and services with a low burden. The original assumption behind the loss 
leading strategy is that buyers will be physically attracted to the retail store, and once inside the store, they 
will be triggered to purchase full-priced items. However, this mechanism may not be applicable to the online 
marketplace. Our study tackles this research gap for furthering the literature on online marketplaces, 
specifically with the two-sidedness i.e., two distinguished sets of user groups (Bakos and Katsamakas 2008; 
Lin et al. 2011; Mantena and Saha 2012; Parker and Van Alstyne 2005) 
The loss leader strategy is expected to directly increase cross-selling opportunities, as proposed in Li et al. 
(2013). In addition to this direct effect on the existing buyers, it can be also leveraged to draw a sizable 
number of new buyers to the online marketplace, which may lead to a positive indirect network effect 
(Eisenmann et al. 2006; Song et al. 2018). When buyers are more willing to join an online marketplaces 
due to a set of attractive and lower-priced products, a greater number of sellers are also likely to participate 
on the platform in order to enjoy the network value on the buying side (Tucker and Zhang 2010). Despite 
the expected benefits of the buying side, however, one possibility is that buyers may purchase only a loss 
leading item on a focal website and browse other websites for other items. Also, when platform providers 
introduce loss leading products and services on the selling side, this strategy may hinder the economic 
incentive of sellers. Due to these possibilities, the effects of the loss leader strategy on the online 
marketplaces is indeterminate and largely remains an empirical question. More importantly, it is necessary 
to measure the mixed impact from the perspective of the platform provider for more effective strategies and 
managerial practices. Accordingly, this study examines the effects of the loss leader strategy in the context 
of the two-sided online platform (hereafter, TSOP). Our research focuses on the changes of both buying and 
selling sides after introducing the loss leader. More specifically, we tackle those questions: Does the 
introduction of loss leaders affect new entries of buyers and thus increase sales on a TSOP? Does the 
introduction of loss leaders lead to an increase of new sellers too? How do the sellers respond to the 
introduction of loss leaders? 
We plan to examine the effects of the loss leader strategy leveraging a rich and unique dataset from an 
online travel marketplace connecting local tour guides (sellers) and travelers (buyers) so that travelers can 
experience a private tour guide with low search costs. As the marketplace planned to expand the buyer base, 
it introduced additional ticket products that can be useful for travelers – e.g., transportation passes or 
admission tickets for popular tourism sites. These ticket products are launched to an increasing number of 
destinations; thus, their prices are set to be relatively lower so as to attract new travelers by lowering the 
entry barrier. This context adequately provides a natural experimental setting for examining the effect of 
loss leaders in the TSOP. 
Literature Review 
The TSOP is a marketplace that enables direct transactions between two distinct types of formally affiliated 
customer groups, where both direct and indirect network externalities exist (Hagiu 2014). TSOP proposes 
a tool or technology for facilitating transactions between those groups (Eisenmann et al. 2006; Hagiu and 
Wright 2011); however, TSOP cannot control the transactions (Rochet and Tirole 2003; Rochet and Tirole 
2006). The roles of each participant can be distinguishable at the point of the transaction (Hagiu and Wright 
2011) while customer groups are formally affiliated to the TSOP. Finally, the size and quality of one side 
influence the users on both the same and the other side (Bakos and Katsamakas 2008; Evans and 
Schmalensee 2008; Evans 2003; Wright 2004). 
With the advent of various TSOP services, such as the App store and eBay, and the advances of information 
systems, its importance and influence have increased. A strand of IS studies and strategy literature has 
attempted to understand the mechanism and the dynamics of the TSOPs. The mainstream of literature has 
focused on the economic aspect of TSOPs, including the price structure or policy issues (Armstrong 2007; 
Bakos and Katsamakas 2008; Eisenmann et al. 2006; Evans and Schmalensee 2008; Evans 2003; Lin et 
al. 2011; Parker and Van Alstyne 2005; Rochet and Tirole 2003; Rochet and Tirole 2006; Rysman 2009; 
Wright 2004). The strategy literature has attempted to explain how firm-level actions influence the growth 
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(and success) of TSOPs among competitors (Eisenmann et al. 2011; Fuentelsaz et al. 2015; Tellis et al. 
2009). Considering the impact of network effects, a lead in drawing early users can preoccupy the market 
in favor of an early mover with an inferior product (Sheremata 2004). On the contrary, Eisenmann et al. 
(2011) found that new entrants with innovative products can successfully surpass dominant platforms, even 
when network effects are considerable. Relatedly, Tellis et al. (2009) argue that product quality is a critical 
success factor in such platforms, and that superior platforms tend to provide the highest quality of product 
over competitors. IS literature more focused on the online setting of TSOPs. Song et al, (2018) examine how 
cross-side network effects could be asymmetric in both short- and long-term, and how these effects are 
influenced by the TSOP’s policies in the context of an Internet browser.  In the video game context, 
Anderson at el. (2013) claimed that platform operators may perform better when decreasing investment in 
platform performance to provide greater content availability from the third party developers. The results 
indicate that greater investment in technology for products is not the only way to win the competition 
between platforms. In those markets where buyers are more interested in content diversity and availability, 
the key to success arises in promoted participants of third party developers. Relatedly, Ceccagnoli et al. 
(2012), in the context of software development, found that participating in a major platform ecosystem is 
positively associated with an performance of independent software vendors. 
While these studies provide valuable insights into TSOPs, few studies have so far attempted to leverage the 
fact that there is heterogeneity in sellers and their products (Mcintyre and Srinivasan 2017). Although an 
emerging body of cases has supported the existence of indirect network effects and the mutually beneficial 
relationship between the buying and selling sides, it is not well known how platforms can strategically 
design and incentivize those indirect network effects that benefit the platforms. Finally, these studies have 
mainly adopted a static or cross-sectional analysis method, and have not examined how relationships 
among the sides of TSOPs evolve over time. For example, the effects of introducing new products on 
platforms in terms of altering those relationships have not been systematically examined. Thus, we expect 
further examination of specific platform strategies that foster the emergence and sustainability of platforms 
over time as an important next step in the literature. In order to fill this research gap, our study examines 
how the introduction of new products alters the dynamics of the platforms.  
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development  
As in a brick-and-mortar context (Blattberg et al. 1995; Hess and Gerstner 1987), price promotion is an 
useful communication tool for online marketplaces. Price promotions provide many benefits, such as 
product and brand awareness, all of which increase exposure to existing and new users and enhance product 
sales. Promotions can influence the buying patterns of buyers, which may affect the sales of regular-priced 
items (Walters and MacKenzie 1988). The bottom line idea of the loss leader strategy, i.e., upselling regular-
priced items through the price promotion of a specific item, is to attract a substantial number of buyers by 
lowering the price of a particular product (sometimes even below its production costs), so that they may 
purchase other (profitable) items (Walters 1991). Specifically, a store can benefit from lowering the price of 
a popular products below its cost and then earning revenue from promoting impulsive buying (Hess and 
Gerstner 1987), as popular products will attract a number of potential buyers to visit the marketplace. 
Regarding this strategy, there is a well-addressed phenomenon that some products confront a huge price 
reduction during their peak demand (Chevalier et al. 2003). An earlier work found that the loss leader 
strategy had a positive influence on increasing traffic (Walters and MacKenzie 1988); subsequent studies 
confirm the significant effect of loss leaders on attracting buyers (Blattberg et al. 1995; Li et al. 2013). 
Since one of the basic notions of TSOPs is that competition among platforms is driven by gathering users 
on two sides, one stream of literature has focused on examining how to draw those sides to the platform 
(Evans 2003; Parker and Van Alstyne 2005). Different pricing strategies are largely adopted by platform 
operators. The findings across the literature suggest that platform operators may subsidize one side of 
users, largely the buying side, by providing considerable discounts in order to attract the selling side to 
participate on the platform, leveraging a type of loss leader (Rochet and Tirole 2006; Rysman 2009). Those 
pricing decisions of platform operators may help them build large networks, and subsequently leverage the 
related positive feedback from existing buyers. Value to buyers may be enriched indirectly when they expect 
platforms with more sellers to provide a greater variety of products (Evans 2003). Potential buyers 
appreciate platforms with a larger number of other buyers in the same network with whom they can interact 
(Asvanund et al. 2004; Cennamo and Santalo 2013; Song et al. 2018). More importantly, we can assume 
those new entries of buyers are likely to provide additional cross-selling opportunities of the existing 
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products through high visibility from the loss leaders. This strategy is significantly similar with those in 
traditional offline retailers, who attract more buyers by offering loss leading products (Walters and 
MacKenzie 1988). Based on the argument, we propose Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1.Introduction of loss leaders on a TSOP will have a positive effect on attracting more buyers.  
Similarly, loss leader strategy may also have a significant effect on the selling side. Given that users on one 
side place a higher value on platforms with a larger number of other side users on the platform with whom 
they can transact, an increased number of buyers with the loss leader strategy would attract more sellers 
(Eisenmann et al. 2006). We expect that a platform’s number of active buyers influences the choices of 
product sellers (Bonardi and Durand 2003; Eisenmann et al. 2011). The more the number of buyers on a 
platform, the more the incentive will be for sellers to introduce more products (Cusumano and Gawer 
2003). For example, in the mobile application industry, choosing a platform with a large user base is more 
valuable to developers, as it offers a greater potential market for their applications, relative to platforms 
with smaller subsets of users. In tandem, these indirect network effects through a greater number of users 
can promote the emergence and sustainability of dominant platforms, and thus, provide strong competitive 
positions for the platforms. On the basis of these arguments, we suggest Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2.Introduction of loss leaders on a TSOP will have a positive effect on attracting more sellers. 
Given that introducing loss leaders consequently helps TSOPs attract more sellers, competition among 
sellers will be intensive because of increasing seller inflow (Tang 2006). Sellers should compete with the 
others for a limited pool of buyers on the platforms. Moreover, on online marketplaces, market 
transparency is high and search costs are low; thus, information of products can be collected and compared 
by potential buyers at a minimal cost (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Schmitz and Latzer 2002). The high 
transparency and contestability of markets further enhance the intensity of competition among sellers. 
Seller competition on TSOPs is a critical agenda for platform operators, as it determines the sustainable 
growth and development of platforms. More specifically, competition among sellers would influence the 
dynamics of TSOPs in several aspects. Among others, regarding competition as a process of strategic 
decision making performed under uncertainty, the competition can be performed to promote the 
productive efforts of the sellers (McAfee and McMillan 1996). A seller competing with more competitors 
may take further actions over others in less competitive markets to satisfy potential buyers’ needs better 
than its competitors (Day and Nedungadi 1994). Thus, we expect that higher market competition due to an 
increased number of sellers on a TSOP promotes extra activities of sellers (Lin et al. 2011; Tang 2006). Thus 
we propose:  
Hypothesis 3.Introduction of loss leaders on a TSOP will promote extra activities of the sellers. 
Empirical Setting and Data 
To examine the hypotheses, we acquired data from one of leading online travel marketplaces in Korea. 
While early literature on TSOPs focused on traditional examples of online platforms such as Amazon and 
eBay , a recent stream of literature on different types of platforms has emerged., such as Internet browser 
(Song et al. 2018) and online dating (Bapna et al. 2016). Our study is within this burgeoning literature on 
TSOPs. Online travel marketplaces has recently received significant attention from IS domain, due to its 
important role in decreasing search cost and transaction cost in the travel industries. It is a suitable context 
to expand the scope of the literature.  
This platform offers a wide selection of private local tours organized by the tour guides, i.e., assortments of 
tourist attractions for one or two days, – hereafter, guided tours. Buyers can browse and purchases those 
guided tours via multiple channels including web browsers and a mobile application. Its main business 
activities consist of several steps as follows. First, the local guides design routes and itineraries for potential 
buyers. After that, they can post the tour guide packages to the marketplace. The marketplace displays a list 
of tour guides with its title, cover image, review summary, and price. Buyers can browse a particular guided 
tour to obtain further information regarding the guided tour, including introduction of the guide, detailed 
itineraries and duration, and review content. Different types of guided tours include sightseeing tour 
attractions, visit to popular local restaurants, and touring museums. Buyers can reserve the guided tours 
via the in-advance payment, and the travelers can communicate with the tour guide before the tour.  
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In addition to the guided tours, the TSOP launched another type of products, tickets and passes (e.g., 
transportation passes or admission tickets to popular visiting sites) in February 2015. They guaranteed the 
lowest rate of any tickets offered for attracting more new buyers to the platform.  These special offerings 
can be regarded as loss leaders – hereafter, tickets to distinguish them from the focal items, guided tours. 
It is expected that the introduction of tickets would promote more buyers, given that buyers visited this 
marketplace via search engines or price comparison sites. As we can assume ticket buyers are travelers 
heading to a specific place, they are potential buyer of the guided tours offered in the same place. The 
marketplace looks for additional cross-selling opportunities of guided tours through high visibility from the 
loss leaders. This strategy is significantly similar with those in traditional offline retailers, who attract more 
customers by offering loss leading products. In addition, considering that the guided tours are designed 
slightly differently to meet customers’ idiosyncratic traits, the customers may hardly find the same guided 
tours across different platforms. We conjecture that the customers have little possibility to prefer a certain 
platform, they rather seek for a local guide who will satisfy their specific needs. This serves as a favorable 
research setting for investigating the impact of the loss leader strategy in a TSOP. The observed differences 
in the platform will be more likely driven by an increase in traffic that the loss leader strategy raises. 
Our dataset consists of the transactional data on sales, guided tour/ticket information, and reviews from 
the TSOP from April 2014 to August 2016. Our dataset contains 2,444 guided tours and 1,489 tickets in 262 
different cities. During the research period, there exist 0.19 million active users, and half of them (0.1 
million users) made 0.26 million reservations. Among the reservations, 58.3% are ticket reservations. In 
addition, we obtained the initial dates, sales, reviews and replies posted by travelers and tour guides of all 
guided tours and tickets during the period.  
To examine the effect of introducing the loss leaders on new entries of both buyers and sellers, we aggregate 
the initial data in the combination of city and month to form a panel dataset. 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the total sales 
of guided tours in city i in month t. 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  is the numbers of guided tours newly created in city i in 
month t. A key variable of interest is 𝐷. 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, which has a value of one if any of the tickets are on the 
list with guided tours in city i in month t, and a value of zero otherwise. In addition, we exclude the cities 
having one or less reservations or having one or less guided tours, which results 3,007 city-month level 
observations with 126 cities.  
We also constructed another dataset at a product level, in order to examine sellers’ behavioral change.  
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡  denotes the number of tour guides’ replies to customer reviews in the guided tour j of 
city i in month t. Note that this variable measures how much the tour guides devote themselves to the given 
tour items, which are proxies for sellers’ extra activities. We create variables for the tenure of the guided 
tours (𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡), the average sales of the guided tours and tickets in the given city in the same period 
( 𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  and 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) , and the number of customer reviews in the given guided tours 
(𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡).  
Initial Empirical Model 
To examine how the introduction of loss leaders affects submarkets’ sales, we utilize a difference-in-
differences specification with the panel data on the basis of the city and month (Danaher et al. 2014). First, 
by comparing the average changes in sales of the control group cities (without tickets) and treatment group 
cities (with tickets), we verify that there exists a common trend in the sales between two groups:  
𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∅𝑡 + 𝛽2∅𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .                                                                             (1) 
𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∅𝑡 + 𝛽2∅𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .                                                                        (2) 
In Equation (1), the dependent variable is the number of guided tour reservations in city i in month t. ∅𝑡 is 
a vector of dichotomous variables for each month (i.e., time fixed effects). Here, we also introduce a variable 
(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖) that indicates whether a submarket of city i belongs to the treatment group (i.e., having 
ever included tickets during the research period). 𝜇𝑖 is the city fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term in the 
model. 𝛽1  captures the time trend of tour sales in control cities, while 𝛽2  measures how the sales in 
treatment cities differ from it. In Equation (2), the dependent variable is the number of new guided tours 
generated in city i with others specified identically with Equation (1). 
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Figure 1. Guided Tour Sales Trend Figure 2.  Inflow of New Guided Tours Trend 
 
Surprisingly, the guided tour sales of treatment cities are growing faster than those of control cities. While, 
all the estimated β2’s are not statistically significant from April 2014 to November 2015, which implies that 
the tour sales of the two groups have a common trend before the loss leader strategy. However, from 
December 2015, all β2’s are statistically significant with p-values under 0.05, which indicates that there 
appear differences in the guided tour sales between treatment cities and control cities. It is also noteworthy 
that the guided tour sales of treatment cities become higher 10 months after the adoption of the loss leader 
strategy. This is because the loss leaders are not simultaneously introduced to all the treatment cities. Seeing 
Figure 2, the β2s are statistically significant from January 2016. Similar to the results presented in Figure 
1, new guided tours are created more in treatment cities after the loss leader strategy. Drawing on that there 
is a common trend in guided tour sales and the number of new guided tours, respectively, we adopt another 
version of difference-in-differences specification in order to measure the average treatment effect of the 
loss leader strategy across the control cities and treatment cities: 
𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷. 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .                                                                                             (3) 
Here, the key variable of interest is 𝐷. 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, and 𝛽1 measures the impact of loss leader strategy on 
treatment cities compared to control cities. If this estimated coefficient is positive and significant, the 
platform’s loss leader strategy has a positive impact on the sales of guided tours. To control for the time-
invariant unobservable characteristics of each city, we include all city dummies ( 𝜃𝑖 ). These inherent 
attributes may include the popularity (which may not significantly change in the short run), geographic 
feature, size, population, and so on. We also include month fixed effects (𝜇𝑡) to control for unobservable 
time-specific factors that can affect all regional travel. To investigate how the introduction of loss leaders 
affects new entries of sellers, we transform Equation (3) by replacing the dependent variable. 
𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷. 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .                                                                                        (4) 
The dependent variable is now 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 that account for the number of guided tours newly created in 
city i in month t. As in Equation (4), 𝛽1 measures the effect of introducing loss leaders on the incentive of 
entrants to offer a new guided tour in the market. 
Finally, to examine how the loss leader items affect the competition among sellers, we look at the review 
activities of sellers at the product level, as follows:  
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷. 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡  + 𝛽3 log(𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽4 log(𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5log (𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝜃𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 .                              (5) 
The dependent variable of Equation (5) denotes the number of tour guides’ replies to customer reviews in 
the guided tour j of city i in month t. Accordingly, 𝛽1 measures the average effect of introducing loss leaders 
on the seller’s efforts to communicate with customers. In this product-level analysis, we control for the 
tenure of the guided tours (𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡), the average sales of the guided tours and tickets in the given 
city in the same period (log(𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) and log(𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡)), and the number of customer reviews in 
the given guided tours (log (𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡)). Also, we include both the tour and month fixed effects 
(𝜃𝑖𝑗 and 𝜇𝑡) to control for unobservable factors, as in the previous equations. The unobservable is captured 
in the error term (𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡). To account for that all the dependent variables are over-dispersed count variables 
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(mean < variance), we adopt negative binomial regression for estimations (Cameron and Trivedi 2013). We 
fit the models using STATA version 14.2 
Preliminary Findings 
Table 1 shows the results of the coefficient estimation of Equation (3) and (4). The estimated coefficients of 
𝐷. 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡  in column 1 is positive and significant, suggesting that introducing tickets increases the 
sales of the existing products. Loss leader strategy is associated with an increase in guided tour sales by 
72.1%1. This notable growth of sales may be a consequence of more buyers, attracted by the loss leaders, 
which supports to accept Hypothesis 1. In column 2, the estimated coefficients of 𝐷. 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡  of 
Equation (3) are positive and significant, suggesting that introduction of tickets also incentivize the entry 
of sellers (tour guides). Loss leader strategy is associated with increased tour guide entry by 102.7%. Our 
empirical evidence suggests that the growth of new buyers from the introduction of loss leaders attracts 
more sellers. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. Tables 2 shows the estimation results of Equation (5). In the 
table, the estimated coefficient of 𝐷. 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡  is not statistically significant. Introducing loss leaders 
does not increase the number of replies to customer reviews, implying that the loss leader strategy may not 
alter existing tour guides’ behaviors. While additional participants join the platform led by the loss leading 
pricing strategy, most tour guides on the platform are not likely to react to the change aggressively. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported. We can assume that the sellers might not notice the deepened competition 
caused by the loss leaders, as the influx of new sellers and their products could be invisible to individual 
sellers. Or those effects from the intensified competition would be realized with some time lags, as 
interactions among players on the platform evolve dynamically over time.  
Table 1. Effects of Loss Leaders on Buying and Selling Sides 
Variables (1) DV: 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 (2) DV: 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 
𝐷. 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡  
0.5427*** 0.7066*** 
(0.0632) (0.1165) 
Constant 
0.2864** 1.5135*** 
(0.1288) (0.1137) 
City and Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 3,007 3,007 
Number of Cities 126 126 
LL -4849.0566 -2221.5183 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** are equivalent to significance at the p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01 
levels, respectively. In column (1) 36 cities are excluded because they had no sales during the research period, and in column (2) only 
27 cities are excluded because they didn’t have new guided tours during the period. 
Table 2. Effects of Loss Leaders on Seller Activities 
Variables DV: log (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡) 
𝐷. 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡  
0.0411 
(0.0375) 
𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡  
-0.0186*** 
(0.0052) 
log(𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡)  
0.0033 
(0.0098) 
log(𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡)  0.0900*** 
                                                             
1 The negative binomial regression models the dependent variables as the logarithm number of the expected count as a function of 
independent variables. Thus, to interpret the estimated coefficients, they need to be transformed into incident rate ratios (IRRs). We 
here report the IRRs. 
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(0.0230) 
log(𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡)  
0.0381 
(0.0254) 
Constant 
0.4507*** 
(0.0984) 
Tour and Month Fixed Effects Yes 
Number of Observations 4,894 
Number of Cities 963 
R-squared 0.0346 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *** is equivalent to significance at the p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
Future Works 
For developing this research further, we plan to expand it in two aspects. First, different empirical 
approaches and models would be examined for confirming robustness of the results. While our current 
models are relatively straightforward, different empirical approaches can strongly support our arguments. 
Relatedly, potential bias may exist due to possible endogeneity issues, where introducing loss leaders can 
be associated with some unobservable factors. More salient aspects of loss leaders may be unearthed by 
considering endogeneity issues in the given setting. Thus, it should be resolved with the accredited 
instruments. Second, we will examine how the loss leader strategy influences user-level dynamics. For 
example, when platform providers introduce loss leading products on the selling side, this strategy may 
hinder the economic incentive of sellers. While loss leading products consequently may help TSOPs attract 
more sellers, given that competition among the extant sellers become more intensive because of a persistent 
seller inflow (Tang 2006). Sellers should compete with the others for an increased, but still limited pool of 
users on the platforms. Regarding these dynamics, future works can delve into how the unique 
characteristics of individual users moderate the interaction between the buying and selling side. 
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